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Introduction 
Diasporic living is necessarily ‘diasporic praxis’. That is, in their everyday living diasporans 
explicitly or implicitly implicate, critique, expose, define, subvert, sometimes even extend, 
the integrity and hegemony of both the nation-state and the diaspora. Diasporic praxis, then, 
is a double-edged sword always with the potential to work in two directions towards 
inclusivity and exclusivity – cosmopolitanism and essentialism. But I nonetheless believe it 
to be an extremely important capacity of diasporic living, firstly because regardless of the 
direction in which the sword cuts, ‘being diasporic’ always implies a unique mode of agency; 
but more importantly because in the right circumstances diasporic praxis can provide vital 
impetus and concrete tools for the ongoing journey towards a cosmopolitan (i.e. more equal, 
inclusive, reflexive and globally oriented) future. This chapter is about these issues, and about 
the difficult but pressing question of how we might begin to identify such concrete tools and 
‘harness’ their potential. It takes the view that diasporic communities and diasporic living are 
a normal and permanent feature of the world and is thus interested in bringing their modes of 
agency to bear upon critical social questions regarding diversity and equality particularly 
through education. In other words, although diasporic communities are often erroneously 
viewed as problems in debates around diversity, one of the arguments of this chapter is that 
they in fact hold key solutions, and any serious attempt at finding solutions must be equally 
interested in what diasporic communities ‘are doing’ and how their actions engage wider 
societal structures.  
A key issue in this context is cooperation between various actors/stakeholders in the global 
arena. And as Carment and Sadjed suggest in the introduction to this volume, our very 
understanding of global cooperation needs to be reconceptualized to include diasporas and 
the advantages they offer. In this chapter I am interested in a particular mode of cooperation 
between certain diasporic and host-national organizations. As I explore below, this form of 
cooperation is intriguing because it is the result of a set of circumstances, and produces a set 
of outcomes, which neither the diasporic nor the national organization can fully control. As 
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such, it allows us to revisit the debate around the relationship between diasporas and the 
nation-state and move it forward by focusing on some of the possibilities for 
cosmopolitanism which arise from their interaction. 
Much has been said in recent years about the challenges which the ‘global postmodern’ is 
posing at various levels for the nation-state, seen usually as a top-down, ideologically 
proscriptive entity. And diasporas have featured prominently in that literature. Since the mid-
1990s, diasporic communities have been seen – both theoretically and empirically – as the 
very embodiment of the problematization of the logic of the national; as the main arbiters and 
perhaps the best agents of alternative models of living. Theories have ranged from Gilroy’s 
declaration that diasporas may spell the end of nation-states, to the by-now-famous ideas 
about hybridity, new ethnicities, third-space, and so on (Appadurai 1996; Bhabha 1996; 
Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1987; Hall 2000). However, there is also compelling evidence which 
alerts us to the still predominant power of nation-states in the configuration of human living 
and experience across the globe (cf. Holton 2011). This is mainly because the logic and 
hegemony of the nation-state – thanks not least to the violent expansionist projects of the 
modern West – have over the last few centuries been very successful in ‘nationalising’ the 
globe; and because all of us, even diasporas, are to some extent subject to the social, political 
and legal apparatuses and structures of the nation-states in which we reside. A third 
dimension in this debate is the equally important reminder from within diaspora studies that 
some diasporic groups can be every bit as essentialist and exclusivist as any nation-state 
(Anthias 1998). In such cases, diasporic groups utilise their transnational connections and 
citizenships, and all the advantages these afford (perhaps we could call this their ‘diaspora 
capital’), to influence or radically alter the politics of home and host nation-states in their 
favour (cf. Kapur 2004; Axel 2008). 
The literature is right to highlight the conflictual relationship between diasporas and the 
nation-state and to draw attention to and critique the myopic and essentialist tendencies rife in 
both. However, a problem with these debates is that not enough attention is paid to instances 
or processes of interaction/cooperation between diasporas and nation-states. And I argue that 
this is a necessary move if we are to seriously challenge those essentialist tendencies. The 
first step in doing this is to understand that – at least for now – the settlement of a diasporic 
community in a host nation-state is deeply significant. To paraphrase Tololyan (2007), the 
logic of the sedentary is a persistent feature (and desire) in people’s migrations; and diasporic 
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communities rely on ongoing engagement with the homeland1 as well as the civic spaces 
which host nation-states provide to continually define and assert themselves. Thus, the nodes, 
as Tololyan calls them, between the connections are of crucial importance. Put differently, 
the activities of diasporic communities, many of which are transnational in nature, depend 
very much on local settlement to become meaningful and to have any social, political or legal 
manifestation. As such, diasporas are not so much about dispersion or return. In fact, 
subsequent generations may have no recollection of the former and no desire for the latter. 
Rather, they are about the practices and discourses – which do not belong fully in either home 
or host country – produced by those generations as settled citizens within ‘host’ nation-states. 
Having established the importance of settlement and locality, we can begin to inquire more 
intently into those practices and discourses and examine how diasporic communities engage 
and cooperate with the local and national structures of their ‘host’ societies. This in turn 
provides an opportunity to explore the potentially transformative role that diasporic 
communities and individuals are playing in the contemporary world in terms of undoing 
nationalistic and ethnic hegemonies and cosmopolitanizing human societies. Of interest, 
therefore, is mainly the question of what diasporas do (cf. Raman 2003), given that ‘what 
they do’ is always significant for social life at ethnic, national and transnational levels.   
I argue that there are some practices through which diasporic communities continually resist 
and challenge the power of home and host nation-states on the hand and their own potential 
essentialisms on the other whilst maintaining some sort of a relationship with those positions. 
I also argue that such practices and modes of interaction are of crucial significance to the 
project of cosmopolitanization generally; and that identifying and studying them allows us to 
‘harness’ and redeploy their potential.  Using a case study from my ongoing research among 
UK Iranians, I will analyse what I have called ‘diasporic education’ as an example of such 
diasporic practice. Diasporic education refers to recent pedagogic and curricular activities and 
logics in Iranian supplementary schools which due to social and historical shifts engage with 
myopic national and diasporic positions in the way described above. They are also always-
already transnationally produced and globally-oriented. They thus point towards an important 
inter-relationship between the local, the national and the transnational centred on the 
particular activities of the diaspora. I aim to show that these activities and interactions open 
up a ‘sweet spot’ between submitting to and subverting both nationalist and diasporic 
                                                          
1 Gaibazzi’s chapter in this volume shows that the home society as well as those who ‘stay behind’ play a far 
more central and productive role in the life of the diaspora than we may have previously appreciated.  
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essentialism. As we will see with the case of diasporic education, the sweet spot is pregnant 
with the energy and concrete tools required to challenge extant hegemonic practices and 
logics in a more explicit and systematic way. That is, the social and cultural practices which 
‘enter’ the sweet spot have their excessive nationalism and diasporicity ‘stripped away’ 
rendering them cosmopolitan. A more radical implication of my argument is that being 
diasporic is not only about asserting and living a diasporic identity (cf. Clifford 1994) – and 
perhaps it should not be studied and theorized as such. Rather, being diasporic – a 
normal/constant feature of human life – is potentially the most potent tool and logic available 
for gradually undoing said hegemonies and essentialisms as we move towards a cosmopolitan 
future. 
Towards Cosmopolitanization via ‘Stripping Away’ 
Nation-states can no longer lay exclusive claim to or fully control all the processes that take 
place within their borders. Nor do those borders have the power – if they ever fully did – to 
act as hermetic seals. They have little choice but to let in all kinds of flows and movements, 
some of which are regarded as ‘pollutants’ – and not just environmental – by national 
ideologies. This is largely the consequence of globalization. That is to say, globalization also 
acts inside nation-states. Beck (2002) calls this cosmopolitanization. And in this way, 
‘globality’ reaches and touches the bodies, minds and souls of everyone – even those 
vehemently opposed to it.  
Beck’s notion of cosmopolitanization differs substantially from any definition we might 
derive from the modern European bourgeoisie. It is instead predicated upon being self-critical 
and is characterised by a ‘dialogic imagination’ which 
…is aware of the clash of cultures and rationalities within one’s own life, the ‘internalized 
other’. The dialogic imagination corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the 
individual experience, which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reﬂect, criticize, 
understand, combine contradictory certainties. (2002: 18, original emphasis) 
Thus, as opposed to the monologic imagination of the nation-states which constantly strives 
to exclude the otherness of the other, cosmopolitanization very much includes all kinds of 
otherness. More specifically, for Beck the cosmopolitan (citizenship of two worlds – cosmos 
and polis) comprises five dimensions: 
1. including the otherness of nature;  
2. including the otherness of other civilizations and modernities;  
Reza Gholami 
5 
 
3. including the otherness of the future;  
4. including the otherness of the object; 
5. overcoming the (state) mastery of (scientiﬁc, linear) rationalization. 
While the first three relate to external factors, the last two are internal to the subject (ibid.).  
Beck’s contention is that the implication of cosmopolitanism in this sense (i.e. globalization 
from within) is a pluralization of nation-state borders, or an implosion of the dualism between 
the national and the international. This means that all sorts of cultural, social, political and 
economic borders operating within and between nation-states become increasingly 
challenged and redrawn. Furthermore, the incongruence of borders leads to what Beck 
describes as ‘a legitimation crisis of the national morality of exclusion’ (ibid.: 19) and poses 
critical questions about the rationale for national hierarchies as well as for how we 
understand, experience and deploy our sense of responsibility. This, I think, is a hugely 
important point, for it underscores the fact that over the past couple of centuries nation-states 
have hijacked and ‘nationalized’ intrinsically human capacities such as feeling responsible. 
Instead of experiencing and deploying this capacity globally, most people’s absolute sense of 
responsibility extends only as far as their country’s border. Why should this continue to be 
the case? And why should powerful groups within arbitrarily demarcated geo-political spaces 
have the ability to shape the lives of so many others – often through exclusion, 
stigmatization, persecution and exploitation?  
These and many similar questions challenge the logic of the national at its very core. So 
much so, I think, that they render it untenable in any serious consideration of a more 
egalitarian, less harmful future. But such a challenge raises further questions. Beck talks 
about the importance of having cosmopolitan principles, norms and memories which gain 
expression through the law – he uses the transnationalization of the memory of the Holocaust 
as an example. But the most important question must surely be: how? How, that is, do we 
mount any serious challenge to the hegemonic structures of nation-states while – at least for 
now – we depend on those very structures to mount any sort of challenge? What if those 
structures suddenly decide that they have had enough of our challenges and shut us down – as 
is indeed the case in many countries? I think we can get at these questions by posing another 
about the Holocaust example which Beck draws attention to: why – as others have also asked 
– has the memory of the Holocaust, arguably much more than other episodes of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing, been so successfully transnationalized and cosmopolitanized? This is in no 
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way meant to detract from the horror of the Nazi atrocities against Jews; nor do I think there 
is anything to be achieved from a comparison of scales of violence and bloodshed. What I am 
interested in is examining whether a particular type of interplay between the national and the 
diasporic is able to produce circumstances conducive to cosmopolitanization, and if so, 
whether we can make this explicit. 
The case of the Holocaust – how it became so prominent especially in the US – is indeed 
instructive. Not surprisingly, it manages to sharply divide opinions among Jews and non-
Jews, Zionists and anti-Zionists, alike (cf. Finkelstein 2000; Novick 1999). Novick has talked 
about how collective memories such as that of the Holocaust lose or gain significance at 
certain times and become redefined according the felt needs of a given generation. And 
Finkelstein has located the ‘Holocaust industry’ as a powerful force in American and Israeli 
politics. Both agree that the Holocaust has come to feature so prominently in American 
consciousness not so much because of the event itself or any links it may have to notions of 
trauma, but because of certain types of representation and interaction between American Jews 
and the American nation-state and its institutions and industries. From this perspective, 
whatever the reality of the Holocaust, its entanglement in national and minority politics and 
culture makes it emblematic of exactly the excessive forms of nationalism and diasporicity 
which I mentioned above. However, it cannot be denied that the Holocaust is also 
significantly about persecution and suffering as well as the human capacity to kill 
indiscriminately. It is about resistance and hope, too. Once we strip away the disagreements 
and accusations, which seem to me to be almost entirely related to excessive nationalism and 
diasporicity, that is where we end up. Therefore, the fact that a certain set of social, political, 
cultural and historical processes have coalesced to give particular prominence to the 
Holocaust in powerful countries such as the US and the UK is in the context of this chapter 
not so much important because it answers the ‘why the Holocaust?’ question. It is more 
important for looking at its prominence ‘after the fact’ and asking: how were the specificities 
of nationalism and diasporicity stripped away to leave us with something that is deeply 
relevant to all human beings everywhere – something which transcends nation-states and 
ethnic groups and has the power to influence the ways those assemblages live their lives in 
political, legal, social and cultural arenas? 
In order for the Holocaust to gain common recognition and form the basis of common 
experience first at national and then at transnational levels the event itself has necessarily had 
to be disconnected from sub-ethnic, ethnic and national specificities. Novick has described it 
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as a ‘common denominator’ and a ‘consensual symbol’ which could only have come about in 
a ‘“folk Judaism” – less bound by tradition and less scrupulous about theological 
consistency” (1999: 200). This does not mean that when diverse school children in the UK 
today talk about the Holocaust they are unaware of its particular links to German Jews during 
the 1930s and 1940s, or that specific ethnic and religious groups (not least Jews) can 
commemorate the event in their own unique ways; it means, rather, that the event has been 
decoupled enough from, and does not lend itself to being fully claimed by, any particular 
ethic, religious or national set of ideologies or practices. So, whether it happened through a 
historical accident or ideological and financial manipulation, a rather serendipitous by-
product has been this ‘stripping away’ of excessive nationalism and diasporicity.  
Crucially, this has taken place mainly within the educational and cultural spheres of 
multicultural nation-states such as the USA. The key words in that sentence are equally 
significant. Diasporic communities, in general, have more and easier access to host nations’ 
educational and cultural sectors than to political and financial ones. It is interestingly also in 
those very spheres that the host society ‘values’ them – where they ‘enrich’ the national 
culture and must be given space to ‘be themselves’ – citizens with a (non-threatening) 
difference. This, we are told, is the necessary logic (or price) of living in a multicultural 
democracy. I argue that it is in this political approach to educational and cultural ‘exchange’ 
that ‘stripping away’ happens. Here, a ‘sweet spot’ is opened up where the national and the 
diasporic find themselves in a potentially uncomfortable position: they have no choice but to 
listen to one another and to make some concessions. Sure: after the exchange they may tell 
themselves that all their forms and institutions are still intact; that their integrity has not been 
compromised at all. But the reality is that once any event, practice or belief enters this sweet 
spot and undergoes the necessarily resulting ‘stripping away’– as indeed has been the case 
with the Holocaust – it will become forever transformed, and open to ongoing transformation. 
It can no longer be completely claimed by any nation-state or diasporic entity, and can thus 
be reclaimed, recreated, re-experienced and redeployed by all humanity. 
The Iranian Diaspora in the UK: Excess and Engagement 
It strikes me as a foolhardy undertaking to even attempt a detailed overview of the UK 
Iranian diaspora given the vast heterogeneity of that group and the limits of this chapter.2 UK 
Iranians will serve here mainly as an example, a case study which derives its usefulness from 
                                                          
2 For a detailed coverage including demographic information see Gholami 2015. 
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the fact that it is (1) replete with what I have called excessive diasporicity (mainly related to 
issues of secularism and Islam); (2) it actively tries to engage Britain (the host country) along 
a number of educational and cultural axes; and crucially (3), sweet spots are now becoming 
more and more commonplace. This section will, therefore, look at the Iranian diaspora in 
these three dimensions, focusing in particular on emerging models of Iranian ‘supplementary’ 
education as a way to exemplify processes of stripping away and the coalescence of a sweet 
spot.  
Secularism and Islam 
It is widely known that the Iranian diaspora largely owes its existence to Iran’s 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. The particular events and currents of the revolution, their history and their 
subsequent developments are all essential for having any sort of understanding of Iranian 
diasporic living. Chief among them, of course, is Shi`ism and its contested social, political 
and cultural role. During the revolution, Shi`ism became more than anything a focal point, a 
symbol of Iranian national unity which drew together vastly heterogeneous social and 
political groups and positions. It is important to remember that many of the factions/groups 
who ‘bought into’ the unifying clout of Shi`ism did not do so out of religious belief or 
theological agreement, but rather pragmatically found in Shi`ism a force and discourse 
powerful enough to mobilize the country against the heavy-handed and pro-West rule of the 
monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (cf. Keddie 2003; Spellman 2004). As such, 
although post-revolution discourse has tended to caste the whole issue as a conflict between 
Islam and Western secularism (and so has the West), the conflict was in fact primarily about 
social inequality, the lack of political plurality, and felt cultural misrepresentation. 
Nonetheless – and owing to the fact that post-revolution Iran became an explicitly Islamic 
state; and the fact that the pre-revolution elite who left Iran were overwhelmingly secular 
royalists and were followed by many other secular or non-Muslim groups – social, political 
and cultural contestations and conflicts have continually centred on the place of Islam and 
secularism in Iranian life. 
It is, among others, for this reason that I find the concept of secularism less than useful in the 
Iranian context. Especially in the Iranian diaspora, ‘secularism’ has come to denote a set of 
discourses, practices and sensibilities which foremost problematize Islam, not other religions. 
In other words, much of Iranian diasporic living – whether explicit or Implicit; whether 
important or prosaic – proceeds through a problematization, even detestation of ‘Islam’; and 
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in many cases, it aims to totally eradicate the Islamic from the Iranian (or ‘the Persian’). I call 
this non-Islamiosity (Gholami 2015). Examples of non-Islamiosity range from seemingly 
mundane daily activities which people engage in without necessarily being fully conscious of 
them – such as children who were born and raised in Britain and have very little knowledge 
of Persian history and language performing subjectivities of ‘being free’ and ‘having fun’ in 
ways which presuppose the long history of the problematization of Islam in Iranian 
modernity – to seemingly more calculated and serious political expressions – such as all 
Islamic events being excluded from diasporic media; and famous TV personalities and 
intellectuals slandering Islam on air using extremely crude and offensive language3 (see ibid). 
Non-Islamiosity, in this sense, is a considerable force of social and personal transformation in 
the Iranian diaspora today (and I believe its impact is increasingly being felt inside Iran as 
well). In the UK, for example, its negative representations and social exclusions are 
influencing the ways in which devout Iranian Shi`a live and experience their religious 
identities (ibid.). By the same token, non-Islamiosity is also being used by many Iranians as a 
mechanism for self-making. It is thus a productive, liberatory modality of power which 
allows subjects to fashion their desired selves by helping them to subdue/defuse their 
‘residual’ religious inculcations. As such, it opens up new spaces in which subjects can live 
‘free’ lives. 
In all these ways, non-Islamiosity is diasporically excessive. That is, it deeply implicates and 
is implicated within particular understandings of Iranian living – its contested terrains of 
culture, language, heritage, history, politics, social organization, and so on. It is about being 
or becoming Iranian by way of a problematization of Islam. A non-Islamious identity may be 
open to non-Iranian ways of living; but this inclusiveness is far from the inclusive dimensions 
of Beck’s cosmopolitanism. It is probably far more strategic and is predicated upon realising 
for the subject a particular, desired experience of Iranian-ness. As I have already alluded to, it 
is my contention that non-Islamiosity is one of the defining features of contemporary Iranian 
diasporicity, and the epistemological and ontological contours of notions of community are 
being defined with reference to its discourses and practices. It is therefore not surprising that 
we have been witnessing cultural and institutional practices which correspond to its 
increasing predominance. A good example here is the University of Mehrafarin, based in 
Encino, California, whose sole aim is re-write Iranian history in a way which discredits and 
                                                          
3 One TV presenter, for example, declared that the Qur`an has less value than pornography (Gholami 2015: 
136).  
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eradicates what it sees as the ‘evil’ influence of the Muslim ‘intruders’. It acts to educate 
Iranians who understand their ‘true’ Persian identity, speak a ‘pure’ Persian language,4 and 
are not ‘duped’ by ‘Islamic nonsense’, following instead ‘Persian’ sources of morality such as  
Ferdowsi’s national epic, the Book of Kings (Shahnameh). 
 Engaging (with) Britain 
It is clear that diasporic practices such as those emanating from non-Islamiosity are unlikely 
to pave the way for a cosmopolitan future. They are in many ways as myopic, violent and 
exclusive as any other ideology or discourse which fights to establish its own utopia. 
However, settlement in a host country and the challenges of conviviality, particularly in 
super-diverse societies, can compel even myopic positions into mutual engagement, with 
potentially interesting effects. Studying diasporic institutions can provide useful insights in 
this regard. As the 1980s became the 1990s, many UK Iranians came to the conclusion that 
their stay in Britain was far more long-term than they had hoped – it was perhaps permanent. 
These people, as well as their off-spring, then began to engage much more seriously in 
British and Iranian social life, seeking out business, employment and education opportunities, 
participating in existing institutions and setting up new ones. Of course, Iranian institutions in 
the UK include those which cater to the needs of a specific religious or ethnic minority such 
as Zoroastrians or Baha’is. They also include those which are affiliated to the Iranian 
government (e.g. The Islamic Centre of England). But what interests me here are the 
institutions which engage directly with wider British society and often with the British 
authorities. These include, among others, the Iranian Heritage Foundation (IHF), the British 
Iranian Business Association (BIBA), the British Iranian Medical Association (BIMA), the 
British Iranian Community Development Organisation (BICDO), Refugee Women’s 
Association (RWA – founded and currently run by an Iranian woman), and SAAM Theatre 
Company. An important point about these organisations is that due to their ‘British-Iranian’ 
nature they have to be culturally and politically diverse and inclusive. They therefore tend to 
value/promote Iranian culture in its broadest sense – including some of its Islamic aspects – 
whilst commemorating key events of the British calendar, and possibly others, as well. In the 
case of RWA and SAAM, inclusion extends explicitly to other ethnic minorities from Asia, 
Africa and Eastern Europe.  
                                                          
4 Which would probably mean eliminating around 40 percent of the Persian language. Persian is influenced by 
many languages including Arabic, Turkish, Russian, French and English. However, Arabic is the one influence 
usually singled out in discourses of non-Islamiosity. 
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We can explore the reasons for inclusivity more specifically by looking at three factors. 
Firstly, whether directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, these institutions 
usually end up representing or speaking for ‘the Iranian community’. In this vein, they often 
construct an image of ‘the Iranian’ which is amenable to the Western palate, so to speak, and 
conforms to idealized images of a highly successful, sophisticated individual. For BICDO, 
for instance, this is an overt aim, as its leader and two of its board members recently made 
clear to me in interviews. BICDO has ambitions of seeing Iranians in Britain’s ‘corridors or 
power’ as top politicians, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and so forth – a goal which is given 
official backing by Britain’s political establishment. This, then, acts as a determining factor in 
the organization’s behaviour and activities. That is, regardless of the personal attitudes of its 
decision makers, the organization must behave in a way which is deemed culturally, 
politically and legally satisfactory by wider British society. Secondly, as the public profiles of 
those in charge of such organizations gain strength, there is also the potential that the Iranian 
government takes an interest in them, especially as many regularly travel to Iran for business 
and pleasure and own assets there. Again, therefore, regardless of personal politics and 
beliefs, they often have to take positions which do not open them up to unwanted scrutiny 
and criticism. 
The third factor is funding. Funding is particularly instructive here because both funder and 
funded depend for their continued existence on the transaction taking place. It would seem, 
therefore, that funding transactions allow national and diasporic institutions to assert and 
maintain their integrity; but in reality the transactions end up destabilizing that very integrity. 
British-Iranian organizations – whose activities have tended to revolve either around 
community support, education and culture, or around a specific professional identity – find 
themselves in an environment of intense competition with a multitude of other organizations 
for relatively limited funding opportunities. Between them, RWA and SAAM cite the 
European Union, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, London Development 
Agency, Arts Council England, the Lottery Fund, and the City of London, as well as a host of 
charitable organizations, as their sources of funding. And BICDO, being interested in 
building research capacity, often bids for funds from relevant organizations such as the 
British Council. In this climate of competition, it goes without saying that funders are able to 
impose some requirements on an organization’s projects. The British Council, for example, 
plays an important role in building relations between the UK and Iran (despite officially not 
having any political involvement). This position hugely influences the Council’s funding 
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activities. Clearly, however, funders cannot exert total control either and must recognize a 
diasporic institution’s identity and objectives, which is usually why they consider funding it 
in the first place. Funding, then, is a significant reason for cooperation between diasporic 
organizations and the social, political and cultural spheres of mainstream British society. 
What is noteworthy, however, is that although both sides are able to dictate the terms of 
engagement to an extent, none is able to do so fully. That is, the result of their interaction is 
something which is greater than both of them; something which always-already challenges 
and undermines the integrity and power of national and diasporic structures, forcing them to 
make concessions, thus opening the possibility for new/alternative modes of praxis. This is 
what I have been referring to as ‘sweet spot’. But it is not so much a ‘new space’ in the sense 
of Homi Bhabha’s Third Space (1994) – a disruptive space resulting from the encounter of 
usually colonizing and colonized cultures which throws into sharp relief the ambivalences of 
self, other and historical narrative. Rather, ‘sweet spot’ denotes the potential to reclaim 
and/or re-create human practices from the grip of excessive nationalism and diasporicity and 
render them cosmopolitan. And it offers specific energy and tools for doing so. It results from 
the suspension of notions of absolute power in national and diasporic imaginations in relation 
to one another; and it is very much predicated upon the fact that both nation-states and 
diasporas live significant parts of their lives through trans-national processes. Their differing 
modes of trans-nationality are an important gateway to the global and the cosmopolitan. All 
this will hopefully become clearer as I examine the particular case of Iranian diasporic 
education.    
‘Supplementary’ Schools  
In the Iranian diaspora, education has been a key site for this kind of cooperation. This is 
because of the high emphasis which Iranians in general place upon ‘being educated’ and 
achieving success through education as well as the importance they have tended to attribute 
to the Persian language and notions of Iranian culture. Iranian educational activities have 
tended to be aimed at Iranian children and young people (ICYP) and usually take place in the 
form of supplementary or Saturday schools – though there is also some provision of adult 
education offered by community organizations such as Iranian Association.5 In London, 
                                                          
5 Iranian Association claim that they annually deal with between 14,000 and 20,000 requests for support in a 
host of issues ranging from education to migration. In terms of education, they respond to the community’s 
needs by providing classes on English language (ESOL), how to pass the UK’s Citizenship Test, job searching, 
general literacy and numeracy, health and hygiene and so on 
(http://www.iranianassociation.org.uk/index.php/services/). 
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schools such as Rustam School, MTO College and Andisheh School are dotted across the city 
and offer ICYP tuition, with Farsi as the medium of instruction, on a range of subjects. 
However, they also increasingly offer tuition using English as the medium of instruction on 
the core subjects of the National Curriculum (English, Mathematics and Science) across all 
levels from Key Stage 1 to A-Level. This is underpinned by the aforementioned emphasis on 
success but also relates to issues which I will discuss presently. Moreover, the schools 
support those pupils who wish to take Persian language GCSEs or A-Levels,6 which is a 
popular way of studying Persian while increasing one’s chance of going to university. Some 
schools boast a high percentage of pupils who have managed to achieve A*s and As in their 
GCSEs/A-Levels in Persian. 
The discussion which is most of interest here relates to the fact that the nature of Iranian 
supplementary schooling has been changing over the last decade. Mrs White, Head of 
Rustam School, the first and currently largest Iranian school in London, told me7 the history 
of this change in her school. Having been established in 1981, Rustam quickly gathered 
support and momentum, rising to its current leading status and boasting an impressive 300 
pupils and fifty-four staff. Mrs White also believed that her school acts as a role model for the 
other sixteen8 Iranian schools in London. Rustam’s founding principle was to ensure that the 
children of Iranian immigrants in Britain learned Persian, their mother tongue. In this way, it 
also wanted to support the survival of Persian language and culture. However, over thirty 
years down the line, today Persian can hardly be said to be ICYP’s mother tongue, as their 
parents overwhelmingly also speak English as their first language. Farsi, therefore, said Mrs 
White, is being taught as a second language.  
This shift has posed some significant challenges – but I think also opportunities – for 
supplementary schools. The first challenge is to their business model. Whereas in the past 
schools such as Rustam relied financially on tuition fees and community support, they are 
now facing a potential decline in pupil numbers and must therefore look elsewhere for 
funding whilst also rebranding themselves somewhat to stay relevant to contemporary clients 
and funders alike. In the case of Rustam, this has meant networking and collaborating with a 
                                                          
6 The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is an academic qualification in specific subjects taken 
by students aged 14-16. The General Certificate of Education Advanced Level (A level) is an academic 
qualification in specific subjects taken by students aged 16-18. 
7 I interviewed her at Rustam School in November 2014. 
8 This was her estimate and is difficult to verify as official numbers do not exist. As for Rustam’s role model 
status, this argument has merit as Heads of other schools I have spoken to often reference Rustam and their 
teaching materials. 
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wide range of Iranian and British organizations, including the IHF (from which Rustam has 
successfully obtained funds in the past), BIMA, BICDO, the BBC and the National Resource 
Centre for Supplementary Education (which imposes a quality assurance framework). As a 
result of these collaborations, Rustam now reaches wider sections of the local (not necessarily 
Iranian) community and offers a more varied educational and cultural experience – such as a 
range of activities aimed at improving physical and mental well-being. In this vein, some 
Iranian schools are beginning to embrace and capitalize upon the increasing demand of 
parents of all ethnicities for supplementary tuition in Maths and English, subjects which the 
National Curriculum values above others. Therefore, the Iranian schools I have worked with 
have increasingly attracted children and young people from an array of ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. MTO College, for example, which is based in Highgate in north London, now 
enrols a number of Turkish, Serbian and even white British pupils. It goes without saying that 
this diversification has a considerable impact on pedagogy, curricula, school management 
and the cultural events which abound at these schools. Heads and teachers now find that they 
cannot take ‘Iranian culture’ for granted in their teaching and cultural activities. But 
interestingly, this has not meant using ‘British culture’ as a common denominator for their 
activities. The ‘alternative’ nature of these schools is never in question, and staff are acutely 
aware of their difference from the mainstream. As I mentioned earlier, it is often this very 
difference which makes them attractive to funders and clients.  
The key point here is that in the context of the aforementioned changes, the reason d’etre of 
Iranian supplementary schooling has shifted to be about allowing minority groups to live well 
and succeed within British society on the one hand – an interesting position which, similar to 
the issue of funding, seems to retain the integrity of those positions but actually ends up 
destabilizing them – and about encouraging pupils and parents to see and commit to the value 
of living multi-lingual and multi-cultural lives. This brings us to the second challenge faced 
by Iranian schools. They are finding it difficult to identify teaching materials suitable for the 
current situation. For years schools like Rustam relied on text books used inside Iran. 
However, with increasing professionalization and diversification, those text books are losing 
their appeal and viability. Furthermore, they are also increasingly ideologically and culturally 
alien to British-Iranian children and young people and so prevent deep levels of engagement. 
In this context, schools – and Rustam has been at the forefront of this – are taking it upon 
themselves to develop entirely novel educational materials. These materials can come from 
formal, long-term projects such as writing and publishing entire text books, or informal, more 
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immediate activities such as synthesising existing materials or ‘making up’ materials from 
relevant socio-cultural texts.  
Two points are particularly important here: firstly, schools sometimes develop their materials 
in collaboration with similar organizations across the world. Rustam, for instance, has 
worked with schools in Canada and Australia. This is a highly diasporic activity which 
utilises transnational networks and local realities simultaneously whilst largely by-passing the 
regulatory powers of any given nation-state. Secondly, however, the contents of these 
materials are entirely relevant to, in fact presuppose, living life in a Western nation-state, 
whilst raising in the pupil a positive awareness of his/her difference. What is more, they show 
the host country to be full of or defined by all sorts of differences, thus painting a horizontal 
rather than vertical picture of difference. Similarly, the materials emphasise Iranian-ness and 
teach Persian language and culture, but do so in a way which is inclusive of difference and 
aims to help young Iranians to lead happy, successful, integrated lives as citizens of 
respective countries. They very much assume permanency of residence (which today often 
encompasses mobility); in fact, they are predicated on the assumption that being Iranian is 
significantly entwined with being British. Thus, they challenge discourses of exclusive 
Britishness (or ‘little Englandism’) and exclusive Iranian-ness and do not allow either to fully 
‘close’ – i.e. they neither completely submit to nor subvert either position. 
Diasporic Education 
Crucially, ‘supplementary’ schooling in the way I have described happens within a space 
which is not and cannot be fully nationalized. That is, the power structures which operate 
within a mainstream, state-funded school and demand a particular and strict sort of allegiance 
to a particular and strict understanding of the Britishness do not operate in the same way or to 
the same extent in ‘supplementary’ schools. During my observations of and interactions with 
staff and pupils, they always conveyed an understanding – sometimes tacit, sometimes 
explicit – that the school is not ultimately bound by the National Curriculum; that alternative 
curricula are used, even created, all the time; that home and host governments cannot exert 
absolute control over what goes on at the school. It is for this reason that I have been placing 
‘supplementary’ in inverted commas throughout the chapter. These schools are much more 
than that. Of course, supplementary schools and schooling have been the subject of academic 
discussions at least since the early 1980s (e.g. Stone 1981). The main focus of these analyses 
was West Indian Saturday schools in Britain (also called Black Saturday schools), which 
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were shown to be a form of grass-roots collective action against the institutional and personal 
racism which was rife in the British education system and placed black children at a 
disadvantage (see Chevannes and Reeves 1987; Mac an Ghaill 1991). Similarly, including 
children of other ethnic backgrounds may be relatively new in the Iranian context, but it is 
not new in the wider context of black supplementary schooling in Britain, as Reay and Mirza 
(1997) have highlighted. What the literature has not paid attention to, however, and what I 
believe emerges very clearly from the Iranian case, is that we can usefully begin to think of 
some forms of supplementary schooling as a ‘diasporic’ activity; or ‘diasporic education’ to 
be more precise. 
I started this paper with the statement that diasporic living is diasporic praxis in that it is 
predicated upon modes of thought and action which necessarily – even if implicitly – engage, 
critique and destabilize the national. I also argued, inspired by Tololyan (2007), that ‘the 
diasporic’ is crucially about the activities of settled communities and their transnational 
connectivity. This casts a wholly new theoretical light on supplementary schooling with some 
potentially very useful implications, including for how we view diasporic communities 
themselves. Focusing on diasporic education, thus, means focusing on a concrete set of 
educational practices which:  
 Come to exist through the transnational connections of diasporic communities;  
 Engage and problematize notions of ‘home’ and ‘host’; 
 Are aimed at improving the lives of diasporan children as settled citizens of ‘host’ 
nation-states, usually in ways which fall outside the ability/willingness of mainstream 
education; 
 Prevent the ‘closure’ of essentialist hegemonies at national and ethnic levels;   
 Cannot be ultimately regulated by any national or diasporic policies. 
Diasporic action is also about a commitment to action – to praxis – aimed at securing a better 
future for everyone. And education seems like a particularly apt field for the unfolding of 
such praxis. That is, educational practices offer a proactively radical sort of edge which can 
enable teachers and students to engage with the cosmopolitan project much more consciously 
and intently. Diasporic education, then, also involves seeing supplementary schools as 
possible sweet spots and exploiting their immense potential to further the cosmopolitan 
project. As we will see, they are sites in which we can reclaim, recreate and re-experience 
those aspects of our humanity which have been so successfully hijacked by nationalist and 
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ethnic ideologies. If it is retorted that people live those aspects through specific national and 
ethnic identities as a way to imbue them with meaning, my response would be that we need 
different/better strategies for conviviality henceforth, strategies which allow for specific 
identities and meaning-making but without an insistence upon full closure, historical 
essentialism and the ever-present potential for exclusion/exclusivism. I would argue that 
diasporic education is concrete enough that it enables us to understand, ‘harness’ and 
redeploy the processes through which excessive nationalism and diasporicity are stripped 
away to leave us with knowledges and practices which can be called cosmopolitan.  
Allow me to see if I can pin down its concreteness more precisely. A key characteristic and 
contribution of diasporic education, as we saw above, is the development of transnational 
teaching materials which are germane to diasporic and national living without fully 
succumbing to either of them. Here, although the ‘host’s’ nationalism and the ‘identity’ of the 
diaspora meet one another in a space of mutual respect and recognition, this very encounter 
destabilizes both of them at all levels. Thus, being Iranian, British, or British-Iranian (or 
anything else for that matter) all become fundamentally re-imagined and re-experienced. 
This, of course, as I also mentioned, is intensified by the fact Iranian schools are becoming 
more and more ethnically diverse, and must therefore find ways of catering for that diversity. 
To ground this more concretely in an example, the cultural events and celebrations which 
punctuate the Iranian calendar are increasingly developing a cosmopolitan flavour – not too 
dissimilar to what Beck describes as the transnationalization of the memory of the Holocaust. 
Nowruz9, the most widely celebrated of all Iranian festivals, is a good example. Rustam 
School now celebrates Nowruz in a way which openly recognises that the festival ‘belongs 
to’ many other cultures and not just to Iranians – something which traditionally Iranians tend 
not to talk about. In fact, it posts on its Facebook page a video clip in which people from 
around the world, including high-profile individuals such as the Obamas, congratulate 
Nowruz in many different languages. It has posted another video which explains the 
international importance of the spring festival. In this way, any Iranian specificity is ‘stripped 
away’ and Nowruz becomes foremost about how people around the world celebrate the 
arrival of spring, which is something that virtually anyone anywhere could choose to 
participate in. I should note, however, that ‘stripping away’ does not mean that Nowruz loses 
its Iranian-ness for Iranians. Not at all. What I mean is that stripping away loosens the rigid 
grip that any culture might believe it has on Nowruz, so much so that insisting on a tight grip 
                                                          
9 The first day of spring (vernal equinox) which also marks the New Year in Iran and other Persianate cultures. 
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all but seems illogical in the minds and experiences of people. Stripping away, in this sense, 
has a real and palpable effect upon the human experience. After this loosening, however, 
Iranians, or anyone else, can celebrate Nowruz in any way they wish, knowing that theirs is 
just one way amongst many, and knowing, crucially, that they can choose to celebrate the 
festival differently. I should perhaps also reiterate here that whereas this stripping away 
happens relatively easily in Rustam school – a particular type of diasporic organization which 
cooperates with British society in the ways described earlier – it is difficult to see how it 
could happen at, say, the University of Mehrafarin, which I also referred to above. 
Other important celebrations are undergoing similar processes. The two most-widely 
celebrated festivals after Nowruz in the Iranian calendar are Charshanbe soori – a ‘fire 
festival’ which takes place on the eve of the last Wednesday before Nowruz – and Sizdah-be-
dar – the thirteenth and final day of Nowruz during which Iranians leave their homes and 
spend the day with their families on picnics. I studied these celebrations during my research 
on non-Islamiosity and found plenty of examples where they stood for a very exclusive and 
myopic Iranian identity, linking them to essentialist notions of ‘Persian’ history and using 
them to devise a narrow blueprint for the future of the Iranian nation. In schools such as 
Rustam, however, that essentialism is largely stripped away because they face, and are to an 
extent accountable to, wider British society, and because of their own internal diversity. Non-
Iranian pupils who see the fun-looking tradition of jumping over fires for the first time cannot 
be excluded from the fun; and once they have experienced it they begin to associate their 
experience with their own creative vocabularies and forms of knowledge. Thus, Charshanbe 
soori stops signifying highly ideological (and usually erroneous) ideas about an inherently 
Persian desire to relinquish Islam and reclaim the true Zoroastrian identity of Iranians (or any 
other number of common explanations on offer) and becomes about all sorts of other things 
which make sense to the people who are participating. As it happens, an emerging definition 
of charshanbe soori which diverse people can relate to and build upon focuses on the heat 
and life-giving properties of fire; and sizdah-be-dar has been rebranded as ‘nature day’, 
which is also suitable for teaching all children about treating the natural environment 
responsibly. It is in these ways that diasporic education is concrete – in the fact that its very 
practice constitutes a sweet spot in which stripping away takes place. 
The final point to make relates to pedagogy. Diasporic education proceeds through the 
principle that teaching and learning are inherently global (dare I say, cosmopolitan) 
activities. That is, however one defines knowledge and skills and their transmission, they 
Reza Gholami 
19 
 
relate to – and have always related to – all humans everywhere. The fact that curricula have 
become nationalized and their subjects neatly distinguished and placed in hierarchies is, if 
anything, a historical aberration, an anomaly which must be undone. This is not a nostalgic 
suggestion that we somehow ‘move back’ to past logics and practices. Indeed, it is entirely 
about the present and the future. I think there is great merit in Beck’s idea that the future can 
now more easily be imagined globally rather than nationally. And it is this moment we must 
capitalize upon. Teaching diasporically, therefore, is foremost a pedagogical commitment. It 
is a commitment to the principle that knowledge must no longer be allowed to be defined and 
monopolized by revisionist national politics which use it to address the skills requirements of 
the capitalist economy. Students may well wish to learn those skills; but they must have a say 
in what knowledge is and what they want to do with it. Furthermore, it is a commitment to 
actively design curricula which have been ‘sourced’ globally and instil global thinking. 
Current national curricula go to great lengths to offer pupils ‘experiences of the national’, 
which is a deeply problematic imposition, perhaps an act of symbolic violence. They off-set 
this through discourses and practices of multiculturalism and thus also offer pupils 
experiences of ‘other cultures’. But this is equally problematic because ‘other cultures’ are 
carefully selected and defined in accordance with wider national politics and hegemonies. 
They can also usually be mapped on to existing nation-states. It is high time, therefore, that 
education offer students meaningfully human experiences – experiences which have 
undergone ‘stripping away’. This sort of pedagogy will open doors to far more reflexive, 
inclusive and critical approaches to teaching and learning especially as they relate to issues of 
selfhood and otherhood. It will enable teachers and students to plan, design, learn, teach and 
develop as human beings together.  
Conclusion 
Above all, this chapter has been about the role which diasporic communities play in the 
societies in which they have settled as well as in the contemporary world more generally; it 
has been about what diasporas (can) do. The question which has concerned me throughout 
has been whether or not diasporas have anything concrete to contribute to the project of 
cosmopolitanization. That is, whether their modes of interaction/cooperation with host-
national structures have any bearing on challenging and undoing the essentialist tendencies of 
both the nation-state and the diaspora, thus giving rise to modes of living that are more 
inclusive, reflexive and global. I have argued that their settlement in host nation-states, the 
fact that they ‘simply’ live their daily lives, is immensely significant because it 
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simultaneously engages national and diasporic structures in transformative ways. Diasporic 
communities should therefore be seen as a permanent and useful feature of the world. And I 
think we should begin to conceptualize them in a way which reflects that. For it seems that 
even within academic discourses, much like political, cultural and economic ones, diasporas 
are still seen as entities which somehow ‘stand out’. We have not yet managed in our 
imagination to ‘blend them into’ the world. Once we do that, we can focus much more 
intently on the implications of their agency. I would argue that of central importance in 
‘being diasporic’ is exactly the field of tension between settlement and mobility which 
diasporas embody and straddle. It is there that they draw the logic of the national into all sorts 
of encounters which it would much rather not be drawn into. And it is there that they open up 
‘sweet spots’ where the excesses of the national and of the diaspora itself can be stripped 
away, yielding an immense potential to reclaim, recreate and redeploy practices and 
knowledges which are – and have always been – globally human. 
I considered British-Iranian organizations in general and supplementary schools in particular 
as a concrete example of these processes. In the schools we find the right conditions for 
studying the ‘stripping away’ and harnessing the potential which results from it. Every time 
such a potential is harnessed and redeployed, I believe we take a step towards a more 
cosmopolitan world – however small that step may be. I have also tried to advance the 
concepts of diasporic education and diasporic pedagogy as concrete tools for stripping away 
excess from cultural practices and for their redeployment, whilst outlining some preliminary 
ideas for how a commitment to this pedagogy can bring about a more global and inclusive 
approach to education, and how it can challenge existing power structures which distribute 
educational opportunities unequally and monopolize them mainly for their own perpetuation. 
Diasporic education, I argued, comprises a set of formal and informal pedagogies and 
curricula which are always transnational in nature but possess a globally-oriented and 
cosmopolitan impetus, and which exploit the potentialities of the diasporic and the national 
whilst escaping their ultimate grip and destabilizing them. 
Whether in education or elsewhere, the particularity of the type of cooperation between the 
diasporic and the national is of crucial importance. As I showed above, ‘sweet spots’ – which 
neither the national nor the diasporic can fully control; which undermine hegemony and 
essentialism at national and diasporic levels; which make the logic of excessive nationalism 
and diasporicity seem nonsensical and indefensible; and which possess the quality of 
‘rendering cosmopolitan’ – only come about when diasporic and national 
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entities/organizations interact with each other willingly and ‘on friendly terms’, each 
promising, as far as possible, to maintain, even celebrate, the integrity of the other; to respect 
and support the objectives of the other. It is only this sort of cooperative encounter which 
allows for such promises to be made – and there is no reason to doubt the good intentions of 
both/all parties for keeping them – yet produces an impetus, and energy, all its own which 
takes away something from the very integrity it was supposed to protect. In the process, it 
also shows that integrity to have always been arbitrary, contingent, problematic; compelling 
us to re-think our understanding of and commitment to diversity and conviviality no longer in 
terms of asserting endless differences along ethnic and national lines, but to foreground our 
shared humanity. 
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